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COMMENTARIES I
REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE

J. HARVIE

WILKINSON III*

It is clear to me, after these proceedings, that I am part of a
problem-ridden profession. I feel disinclined to undertake a fullscale counterattack on what Dean Griswold and Dean Carrington have said, mainly because some of the problems they
pointed out are quite real. My own feelings are somewhat impressionistic as far as the explosion of litigation is concerned,
and an explosion is clearly what we are talking about because all
the other problems that have been discussed trace to this one
fact.
My primary goal as a judge is to cast an informed vote, because that vote is what affects the parties. One of the dangers is
that the crunch of cases is going to lead judges to rely too exclusively on substitutes for briefs and records, particularly, law
clerk bench memos. On some cases I have my law clerks prepare
bench memos, but I try very hard not to let those bench memoranda become a crutch. I try to read the briefs. What disturbs
me is that I have all too little time to get into the record. I have
to deal with the record of the case very selectively. There is a
requirement that briefs make specific references to the record,
and I look into the record to see what interests me when a brief
refers me to it. Nevertheless, the day of having the opportunity
to read a record straight through is long gone.
I think this relates to what Dean Carrington properly regards as an important function of the courts of appeals, which is
the correction of error.1 Regardless of the precedential value a
decision may or may not have, it will have a very significant impact upon the lives of the people involved. That is the bottom
line. I do not think we can forget that, at the end of the road,
there is going to be an order and a mandate and somebody's life
is going to be affected in a very tangible way.
I would like to spend just a moment on what Dean Griswold
*

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. B.A., 1967, Yale

University; J.D., 1972, University of Virginia.
1. See Carrington, supra pp. 424-25.
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identified as the consequences of the litigation explosion. He
spoke of a loss of collegiality within the judiciary. We are so
busy catching up with our casework, he thinks, that we have too
little time to talk among each other and to negotiate our differences of opinion in cases. I think that is much more of a problem
at the Supreme Court than it is at the court of appeals level. We
are blessed because seventy-five to eighty percent of our cases
are cases on which good judges using good lawyerly skills can
come to an agreement. That is not true of the Supreme Court's
docket. It is a great luxury for a court of appeals to have some
tax cases, admiralty cases, bankruptcy cases, and commercial
cases on which a consensus can be reached. I also think the fact
that we sit in different panels and with different judges each day
helps our deliberations. It is good to sit with different judges in
different combinations so one does not square off on the same
issues with the same judges time after time. It helps those of us
at the circuit court level maintain a degree of collegiality that is
more difficult when the same people confront the same highly
charged docket every day.
I am concerned, as is Dean Griswold, about the plurality
opinions and the separate opinions of the Supreme Court. I do
not know that that is causally connected to the problem of the
litigation explosion. It would seem that the more cases one has,
the more pressure there would be to write less and not more. I
am mystified why the growing number of cases means more writing rather than less. I think it must have something to do with
the personal dynamics within the institution. Certainly, a major
responsibility for cutting down on separate opinions lies with the
Chief Justice, whose power it is to assign opinions in the first
place. Also, one of the major tasks of jurisprudential leadership
that faces the new Chief Justice is to try to cut down on the
plurality opinions and address the problem identified by Dean
Griswold. I remember one afternoon at the Justice Department
during which we were faced with a barrage of press inquiries in
the wake of a particular Supreme Court case. The press wanted
to know what the decision meant. We could not immediately tell
them because it took some pretty good lawyers several hours to
try to figure it out, We simply could not determine how many

2. See Griswold, supra p. 400.
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Justices would line up behind how many propositions. We could
not comment on the decision until we knew with certainty the
holding, and determining that was not easy.
Dean Carrington and Dean Griswold both take the courts of
appeals to task for what they called discretionary justice.3 Dean
Carrington says that we have forsaken the function of error correction for discretionary justice-that there is so much law and
so much doctrine out there that we can just pluck from here and
there to reach the results that we want. If that is the trend, I
think it is a very unhealthy one.
Let me just mention from a circuit judge's point of view one
of the problems that we face. If I knew how the Supreme Court
were going to decide a case, I would regard it as my obligation to
decide it the same way. That prediction, however, is often very
difficult to make. A great deal of the criticism directed at the
circuit courts of appeals for discretionary justice is frankly a reflection of the fact that the Supreme Court has set, in many areas of law, a deeply divided course, and a course in which no
clear direction is evident. We do the best we can. It would be an
easier job if the task of understanding the Supreme Court's
course on a given set of issues were easier.
I also call attention to the fact that the court of appeals is a
derivative court. It should be inculcated in circuit judges that a
presumption of correctness often belongs to someone else. It belongs to state courts in diversity cases. It belongs to the federal
district judge on the admission of evidence and findings of fact.
If it is a constitutional matter, we should defer to the Supreme
Court. If it is a statutory matter, we defer to Congress. If it is a
regulatory matter, we defer to the agencies. In section 1983 suits
there is a presumption of good faith on the part of the school
board or the warden, or at least there is a good faith immunity.
There is always a presumption somewhere, and a good judge
does not overturn those presumptions without a very solid reason for doing so. I think a reminder about the cautious nature of
the reviewing function will help reduce some of the complaints
about discretionary justice.
Dean Griswold points to two Ninth Circuit opinions within
the space of a year that directly contradicted one another.4

3. See Carrington, supra pp. 420-23; Griswold, supra p. 409.
4. See Griswold, supra p. 404.

440

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw

[Vol. 38

Sometimes on the circuit court of appeals, I think we are always
being judged by the Ninth Circuit. People look at the Ninth Circuit and say, "Look what problems they are having." They judge
the entire system by the experiences of a single circuit. Intracircuit conflicts are a problem. They occur more often on larger
circuits. There is, however, a world of difference between a small
circuit such as the First Circuit, a medium-sized circuit such as
the Fourth Circuit, and a large circuit such as the Ninth Circuit.
We have a practice on the Fourth Circuit which, I think, is different from many circuits and which helps to reduce intracircuit
conflicts. We do not merely circulate opinions to the panel members who heard the case. We circulate our opinions to the entire
court: eleven active judges and two on senior status. Many
times, the judge who complains loudest about a particular opinion will not have been a judge who actually sat on the panel.
This is a good thing because if you are dissatisfied with a previous opinion, you still ought to follow it as a matter of precedent.
Human nature being what it is, you are a lot more likely to follow a previous opinion if you know you are going to have to run
your opinion through the eyes of the person who wrote the previous one. He is going to be able to object and tell you that you
are not following his precedent before your case comes down.
This is a salutary rule and it helps us to maintain, as best we
can, a coherent body of circuit law.
Let us pass from the problem to some of the solutions. So
much has been said about so many solutions. I would not begin
to try to canvass all those ideas. I do think that a lot of this
litigation explosion is a self-inflicted wound. I think that much
of it is caused by a great suspicion toward the exercise of authority that developed primarily as a result of three events. First,
the unjustifiable abuses of state governments, many of them in
the South, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Much of the growth
of habeas corpus and section 1983 jurisprudence traces to the
abuses of power that occurred in the South immediately after
Brown v. Board of Education. Then came Vietnam and, after
that, Watergate. Authority was so thoroughly discredited that
attacks on authority became legitimate. The federal courts,
aware of these experiences, helped to legitimize attacks upon au-

5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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thority. In many cases, federal judges themselves came to distrust the exercise of authority, whether in state courts, in the
prisons, or in the schools. Many federal judges became suspicious of the capacity of those in authority to treat individuals in
good faith. As a result, it seems to me that the federal courts
took on a lot more than they could handle. We may be moving
out of a phase in our history in which this automatic distrust of
authority is justified. We have got to move back, it seems to me,
to a position in which the federal courts can trust people to do
the things for which they are primarily responsible. Many of the
solutions to this problem do not require a statute or major structural reform within the federal system. They require a sense of
limitation and a sense of priority on the part of federal judges.
Two Supreme Court decisions greatly reduced the workload7
in the federal courts: Allen v. McCurry6 and Stone v. Powel.
They are very low visibility decisions as far as the general public
is concerned; however, in those cases much was done to have
search and seizure issues resolved first and finally within state
courts. That has done a tremendous amount to relieve the burden on federal courts. On the other hand, there are cases like
Patsy v. Board of Regents8 'which held that one does not need
to exhaust administrative remedies in section 1983 cases. Cases
like Patsy add an enormous amount of litigation to the federal
courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court itself has great control
over our dockets and the problem of litigiousness.
The other part of the responsibility lies, I think, with Congress, which has the ability to preempt, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, almost any area of state law it desires to supplant.
I am surprised by the number of detailed statutes that deal with
everything under the sun. There is just an extraordinary amount
of federal legislation. It often takes the federal courts years to
resolve crucial issues regarding this legislation. For example, it
was not until the Burdine case9 in 1981 that the proof scheme
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 was really resolved in any meaningful way. It took the courts seventeen years

6. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
7. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
8. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
9. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
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to develop a settled method of procedure under a landmark enactment. I hope Congress understands just how long it takes the
judiciary to digest complex legislation. Meanwhile, it is a litigator's field day.
There have been many interesting ideas that Dean Carrington and Dean Griswold have put forth about structural reforms. I am most interested to hear what the other commentators have to say, so I do not propose to dwell on all of them. I
would say something, however, in response to Dean Griswold's
discussion of specialized courts. 1
I think this must be dealt with cautiously and very much on
a subject-by-subject basis. There is a danger in leaving whole
areas of law to the specialists and to the particular political interest groups in an area. If, for example, we were to have a specialized court in labor law, would we be leaving appointments to
that court to the same pull and tug of business and labor interests that now characterize appointments to the Labor Department and to the National Labor Relations Board? Is it not better to have some judges dealing with labor law problems who
were not proposed by the special interest groups on either side
of the field? Antitrust law presents a slightly different kind of
problem because there seems to be a clash of economic and academic theories propounded by those who acquire a very keen
and partisan intellectual interest in them. I am not sure I want
to leave appointments to the antitrust court to the tug and pull
of those competing schools of thought.
I also think it is hard to pigeonhole cases. Within a single
case, we often have overlapping claims and knotty procedural
problems. For example, sometimes an antitrust claim will be
only one of three or four significant questions in a case. Therefore, I think we might have some jurisdictional problems in routing cases to the right court.
A final plea regarding specialized courts: I do not think that
the increasing complexity and specialization of the world ought
to make us panic. I do not think that we should sell short the
range and versatility of general analytical powers. There is a
high order of analytical ability in the upper reaches of the legal
profession, which continues to cut across a range of substantive

11. See Griswold, supra p. 408.
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problems. Judge Posner points out that we may not be specialists in this or that, but we are specialists at judging. General
acumen can compensate for some deficiencies of expertise.
I do think specialized courts could serve a useful purpose in
the area of taxation. Here I must confess to you that I go out of
my way to avoid an intercircuit conflict. If I think an earlier tax
decision of another circuit court is wrong, I would not hesitate to
disagree with it. But I am so sensitive to the concerns that Dean
Griswold has that I accord a presumption of correctness to a decision that an earlier circuit court panel has made on a question
of taxation. Unless I have a very good reason for voting to depart from that decision, the values of uniformity and stability
and the avoidance of conflict are paramount. It may be that in
the field of taxation we have not served the legal profession as
well as we should have. I am cognizant of the need for answers
to many questions that the Supreme Court lacks the capacity to
undertake.
I have only one final comment. Regarding a National Court
of Appeals, commentators have suggested the need for a Supreme Court that would confine itself to high-profile constitutional questions, leaving the National Court of Appeals to the
resolution of statutory conflicts. Dean Carrington said that one
of the difficulties of the 1925 Act is that the Supreme Court and
the circuit courts have lost their function as error correction
tribunals and that we have become policy-making bodies.1 2 If we
had a National Court of Appeals, I wonder whether it would not
transform the Supreme Court into even more of a court of constitutional philosophy than it is at present. It might move us
further away from the perception of the Court as a court of law.
I agree with Dean Carrington that the public perception of
courts as courts of law is terribly important to the authority of
law, and, as august as the Justices of the Supreme Court are, I
think it benefits every judge to engage in very close quarters
statutory interpretation. It is a fine technical exercise and yet it
helps to remind us of who we are, and that is, first and foremost,
lawyers.
I want to thank Dean Griswold and Dean Carrington for
what I thought were most illuminating and interesting papers.

12. See Carrington, supra pp. 424.28.
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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR HERBERT WECHSLER*

I want to comment primarily on Dean Griswold's paper, but
I shall have a few things to say about Dean Carrington's paper
as well. Let me begin by saying that I served on the Hruska
Commission, 3 to which reference was made, through all the
years that it sat. I supported, indeed I helped to develop, the
proposal for the National Court of Appeals that would adjudicate cases filed in the Supreme Court, which were within its appellate jurisdiction, and which the Court chose to refer to the
National Court of Appeals rather than either to decide itself or
to deny further review. Also, we made proposals that would have
given the National Court of Appeals a transfer jurisdiction; that
is, a regional court of appeals would have been authorized to
transfer a case to the National Court of Appeals when it concluded that a nationally binding decision was needed. That aspect of our recommendation encountered so much resistance initially that Senator Hruska decided to drop it from the bill he
introduced to enact the proposals of the Commission.
Second, let me say that the Commission supported the proposal for the National Court of Appeals, not as a means to relieve the Supreme Court from an excessive burden, which had
been the motivation of the Freund Committee 14 a few years earlier, but precisely for the reason that Dean Griswold stated in
his paper-to enhance the appellate capacity of the courts of the
United States to render nationally binding decisions. Although
these decisions, which would be binding on all circuit courts, on
the district courts, and on the state courts, would be subject to a
theoretical possibility of ultimate review in the Supreme Court,
we felt, as Dean Griswold said he feels, that one could be quite
confident that further review by the Supreme Court would be
granted very rarely once the Supreme Court itself had made the
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law Emeritus, Columbia University. A.B., 1928, City College of New York; LL.B., 1931, Columbia University; LL.D.,
1962, University of Chicago; LL.D., 1967, Harvard University; LL.D., 1978, Columbia
University; LL.D., 1984, Georgetown University.
13. COMM'N ON REvIsION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRucTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
14. REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57

F.R.D. 573 (1972).
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decision to refer the case to the National Court of Appeals.1 5
We favored establishing a permanent court with appointments by the President and confirmation by the Senate. The
present proposal of Chief Justice Burger, 16 which, as Dean Griswold said, relies upon a pragmatic compromise, is to establish a
temporary court for five years for experimental purposes, with
personnel drawn from the present circuit judges. I would favor
that proposal as better than nothing.
I must say, however, that I respect the extensiveness of the
hostility to this idea, which has slowly developed through the
years. Indeed, my judgment at the moment would be that this
will not be enacted, certainly not in the proximate future, however great the need for it may be. Hence, while I no more wish to
be a prophet than any of the other persons on this program, it is
my belief that for a very substantial period of time to come, the
Supreme Court will have to function as it does without enjoying
the additional option (which is the way I view it) of achieving a
nationally binding adjudication by reference to another court.
Therefore, we will continue to have 180 or so nationally
binding adjudications from the Supreme Court annually, since
that number cannot be increased. All one has to do is count the
days in the week and the weeks in the year to satisfy oneself
that there are logistical limits to what the Supreme Court can
decide. That method is not a very satisfactory solution, but
many people, I think, will feel that it is preferable to any
alternative.
I did not understand Dean Griswold to have said that he
believes that the Supreme Court situation contributes to the
idea that we have a system of discretionary justice. Discretionary appellate review is not the same as discretion to decide the
merits of a case without regard to binding legal norms. As was
pointed out earlier, we lived for many years without appellate
review in many categories of cases within the federal system. 1 7
Discretionary review in the highest court, as in England in the
House of Lords, is really almost universal in our system. What

15. See Griswold, supra pp. 407-08.
16. See Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Am. Bar Ass'n Midyear Meeting (Feb. 17, 1985), reprintedin The State of the JudiciaryAddress: The Time Is Now

for the Intercircuit Panel, 71 ABA J. 86 (1985).
17. See Wright, supra p. 386.
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we can ask, however, is that the Court be prudent and sensitive
in the exercise of its choice of the cases to review. I do agree
with Dean Carrington that a certain price is paid for the discretionary system.18 I put it to you only that it is an inevitable
price; therefore, we ought to ask ourselves what can be done to
improve the situation within the framework that we have. So
much for the National Court of Appeals point.
I really believe that the larger problem is in the circuit
courts. I think the catalog of circuit proposals, one of which
Dean Griswold mentioned, may be a significant alleviation, but
only an alleviation. To a larger extent than our ideals have heretofore admitted, we are going to have to live with the notion that
legal administration will take on more and more of the qualities
of ad hoc arbitrament or arbitration and less of the egalitarian
quality of governmental intervention under law that our ideals
have pictured in the past. I see no escape from that result if the
phenomenon of steadily increasing volume persists in future
years.
The other aspect of Dean Griswold's paper that I want to
say more about does not involve the judicial structure, but his
lamentation about the effects of the volume explosion on the judicial process and its consequences.19 I hope that in his distinguished old age he does not permit himself to renounce the great
achievements that have happened in my litetime in the nature of
the judicial function as conceived in the United States. Specifically, I grew up in those exuberant 1920s at Columbia University
to which Dean Carrington referred-the Oliphant days, during
which the nature of law was being turned upside down. The
great thing that emerged in my student days under the leadership, I would say, of many of the people at the Harvard Law
School, including Dean Griswold, was that the closed case system in which my father's generation believed became a thing of
the past. The message that Cardozo so eloquently articulated
was that the application of law under a system of precedent involves a constant and inevitable reexamination and reevaluation
of what had been held in earlier cases. That seems to me to state
in a nutshell the present view of precedent. This view is particularly exemplified, I think, in the federal courts, although now
18. See Carrington, supra pp. 420-23.
19. See Griswold, supra pp. 403-06.
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many state courts share that view as well. I hope and pray that
neither the pressures of volume nor anything else is going to
modify that view, and if this means that it is harder to advise
clients or that there is bound to be a certain element of inequality in the application of law, I accept that as the lesser evil. We
must have a living law. Dean Griswold recognized that there
would be people holding the view that I express. I simply want
to get on the record about how firmly I hold that view.
Therefore, if we are to envision improvements in the system, they must come within the approach to case law that is now
conventional and taught in the schools and no longer regarded
as novel. I can assure you that my father would have repudiated
it even more vigorously than Dean Griswold did, but he was admitted to the bar in 1896. He reflected the views of his generation, and they did not do very well with the legal system. Indeed, the legal system as it existed in 1931, when I took my law
degree at Columbia, was a shambles; and I say that in measured
terms and with a firm conviction. It has its weaknesses today,
but it has had enormous achievements and much that represents
the best in our legal environment and in our culture would not
have been possible under the older view. All of this means, I
think, that we are not likely to emerge, even from careful evaluation, with great change in the appellate system as it stands.
There is, however, another perspective, and it is one that I
will take my last minutes to put before you. I think that what
has been said thus far completely overlooks the fact that the
problems of the federal courts in the next hundred years should
not be stated as the problems of the federal appellate courts.
The district courts are the main bulwark of action in the system;
and the problem is whether the extremely valuable resources
that they represent are, under present law and present statutes
concerning jurisdiction, remedies, and substance, used with prudence and wisdom. To face that question calls for focus on all
the statutory delineations of the jurisdiction of the district
courts, on the sources of federal law whether they be statutory
or decisional, and on the kinds of lawsuits that are subject to
federal adjudication, asking if they involve a waste of finite federal resources or call upon the courts to make determinations
that should be made explicitly by Congress.
What is required as I see it goes beyond the ALI study,
completed in 1968, of the division of jurisdiction between state
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and federal courts2 ° or Judge Henry Friendly's Columbia lectures of 1972, which he called Federal Jurisdiction:A General
View, 21 although both those works would render great assistance. Unless and until a project of the dimension I propose is
instituted under proper auspices (ideally, authorized by act of
Congress), the logistical problems that plague the courts today
will persist and may get worse, and the indeterminacy of our law
upon so many central issues will inevitably be exacerbated.
I put it to you that those of us who care about the federal
judicial institution ought to put our shoulders to the wheel, and
the prospects are not good. The smallest proposal for change
evokes special interest hostility whenever it impinges on any
special interest, and Congress has simply not equipped itself to
deal with problems of this order, even when great skill has been
conscripted in the effort. Consider, for example, the proposed
federal criminal code started under the very influential auspices
of Senator McClellan of Arkansas. In the end, the fragmenting
criticisms attached to various particular aspects of the matter
put an end to the effort. And so, perhaps, I think that here, as in
so many other areas of our lives, we still confront the problem.
Consequently, a problem for our democracy is figuring out how
to elect a Congress that will feel an obligation to the public who
chose them to give continuous, vigorous, and knowledgeable attention to the maintenance and improvement of the legal
system.

20. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969).

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BrwEEN

21. Lectures delivered by Judge Henry J. Friendly, Columbia Carpentier Lectures,
Columbia University School of Law, reprintedin H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW (1973).
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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR PAUL M. BATOR*

I agree enthusiastically with Dean Griswold's paper and

with the diagnostic, although not the prescriptive, parts of Dean
Carrington's paper.22
We have had two big problems discussed today. First is the
problem of litigiousness. I will not pause on this, although I
think it is ironic that nobody has talked about the contributions
of the legal profession to this atmosphere of litigiousness. The
second problem, on which there is really a remarkable congruence between Dean Griswold and Dean Carrington, can perhaps
be summarized in this way: There has been, as a consequence of
the litigation explosion, a diminishing capacity-and perhaps
also a diminishing sense of responsibility-in the federal appellate system to perform the modest, but important, professional
work of appellate courts. This work includes the correction of
injustice and error, the cleaning up of mistakes and malfunctions and muddles, and the provision of intelligent and intelligible guidelines to citizens and lawyers and lower court judges on
what is the law and what are the rules of the game.
The worst offender, by far, in this diminution in the professional quality of appellate lawmaking is the Supreme Court of

the United States. You may be rather shocked by what I am
about to say next, but I think in terms of professional criteria-care in the choice and use of legal materials and in the

craftsmanship of opinions-the worst federal court in the country is the United States Supreme Court. It is followed very
closely in that race by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, which is most like the Supreme
Court among the courts of appeals. On the whole, the regular
courts of appeals are more professional and much less political
than the Supreme Court. That is, in part, because their cases
require or evoke professional rather than political responses in
more situations.
In the case of the Supreme Court, as Dean Griswold says,
* John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B., 1951, Princeton
University; M.A., 1953; LL.B., 1956, Harvard University.
22. Just to drop a footnote here, I do not understand Dean Griswold's critique of
the present federal appellate system to suggest a return, as Professor Wechsler seemed to
think, to a formalistic or narrow methodology of deciding appellate cases.
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the Justices seem simply to have lost the capacity to function as
a court. We do not have one Supreme Court. We have nine socalled "offices," which churn out elephantine and unintelligible
opinions concocted largely by law clerks. These opinions do not
provide the country with sufficient intelligent and intelligible
guidance.
I would like to add two points to Dean Griswold's account
which illustrate the fact that the Court is no longer able to provide the country with sufficient appellate court guidance. The
Court has almost abandoned any attempt to supervise the application of commercial and business law in the private sector. It is
simply not interested in private business cases. For instance, it
virtually never even reviews a tax case unless the Government is
the petitioner or agrees that certiorari should be granted. One
can come to the Court with a case in which some dog has sniffed
out an ounce of marijuana, and the Justices cannot wait to get
their hands on it. But they are not interested in the economic
and business life of the nation, which is regrettable because that
prejudices our ability to improve the law in that field. There is
no national appellate capacity in that field.
That leads to my second point, which is that the statistics
actually overstate the extent to which there is access to Supreme
Court review. Dean Griswold stated that about 150 cases are reviewed on the merits with opinion;23 however, 150 cases grossly
overstates reality, because about one-half of the 150 are cases in
which certiorari is granted at the petition of the Federal Government or in which the Government accedes to certiorari. The
Government has a terrific chance at Supreme Court review. Approximately eighty percent of their petitions for certiorari are
granted. If you take about seventy-five or eighty cases out of
that statistic, the statistics become infinitely more dramatic.
Furthermore, even in the seventy-five or eighty cases that remain, the so-called private cases, the Government has a very
large influence because the Court very often asks the Government its views on whether it should take a private case. In addition, the recommendations of the Solicitor General are very influential. Thus, access to the Supreme Court is now very much
23. See Griswold, supra p. 403. These emanate from the 30,000 plus cases in the
courts of appeals and from the numerous cases-perhaps another 20,000-in the state
courts in which a federal question is dispositive.

1987l

COMMENTARIES I

in the hands of the executive branch of the federal government.
I think the Court has, in fact, gone too far in this respect and
the explanation lies with the case explosion. The Solicitor General's office is a remarkable and superb organization. It gives
very high quality advice. As a result, I think its advice is now
followed too much, and the Court relies too much on the Solicitor General's office in deciding what cases to hear. In private
litigation no chance of Supreme Court review exists unless there
is a direct conflict among circuits or unless one has a case of
absolutely stupendous importance or dimension.
So, the case for the proposition that there is insufficient national appellate capacity seems overwhelming. Therefore, the
case that some structural institutional change is necessary and
eventually will prove to be inevitable also seems irrebutable.
However, like Professor Wechsler and others, I am rather pessimistic for the near term. I think the situation is going to have to
get much worse before there can be improvement. There are
many interest groups that are naysayers to any suggestion for
change, and there exists deep resistance on the part of the federal courts of appeals judges to any proposal for institutional or
structural change. A deep conservatism is present. Consequently, there is always a litany of objections to any proposal
that is made. I was rather struck by Judge Wilkinson's submission here this afternoon because it shows that he, too, even after
two brief years, has joined the clan.
Let me say a quick word about Dean Carrington's sugges24
tion. I appreciate that one should not jump too hard because
his proposal was really, I think, just a trial balloon. Nevertheless, an interesting discrepancy exists between his diagnosis of
the ills of the system and his suggestion that there should be an
error-correcting junior court of appeals system just above the
district courts. This proposal would leave the existing courts of
appeals to be discretionary courts without responsibility for the
error correction function. It seems to me that this proposal
would widen the scope of discretionary jurisdiction and would,
therefore, be a step in the wrong direction. It would make the
courts of appeals more like the Supreme Court, and the thing
that we do not need today is more supreme courts.
24. See Carrington, supra p. 433.
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Another proposal, which is not quite the same as his and
which he has criticized,2 5 but which is closely related, is the idea
that the courts of appeals should have a discretionary jurisdiction and that we should simply end the institution of the appeal
as a right. This, too, strikes me as a terrible idea. I think that if
this idea seriously comes on the scene, lawyers will finally really
just stand up and say, "No." I cannot imagine that lawyers want
to go back to the days when they are simply at the mercy of the
district judge, which today often means at the mercy of the federal magistrate.
I think a National Court of Appeals, or something like it, is
absolutely inevitable and will come to pass simply because we
need an increase in our capacity to render authoritative, nationwide decisions. Another change that I think is inevitable and desirable, and against which Jay Wilkinson raised his voice and
which is much resisted by federal judges, is the idea of specialization at the appellate level. Obviously, there are misgivings and
fears and criticisms one can make of this idea. There are disadvantages to dividing the appellate task by subject matter or by
making distinctions between civil law and criminal law; but
some of the dangers can be avoided by creative architecture in
the proposal, making sure that the specializations are not too
narrow. This would eliminate the fear that you get a very political labor court, which does nothing but labor, and all the political pressures then focus on that. More generally, I think that the
risks and disadvantages of specialization have been greatly
exaggerated.
We might pause here and learn a little from other legal systems. The fact is that there is specialization in every mature legal system other than ours. We are really the exception. In every
other legal system, even the British system, which is most like
ours in its nonspecialization, the appellate task is not simply
jumbled into one general court. There are functional and subject
matter allocations in France, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and,
to some extent, England. And it happens without terrific and
dire consequences.
If we have a national court for administrative appeals or tax
appeals or whatever, it would have many advantages. It would

25. Id. at pp. 429-31.
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obviously add to the national capacity to render authoritative
nationwide rules. It would also help alleviate the diminishing
sense of professional responsibility in our appellate courts. That
is, I think it would have a substantive impact on some of the
problems that Dean Carrington and Dean Griswold recognized. I
think specialization would give courts an added substantive
sense of professional responsibility over the intelligibility and
the soundness of the development of the law in that field. One of
the problems in our federal judiciary today is that no judge has
any sense of inner responsibility for the development of law in
an area. In other words, what we would have is a somewhat less
political and a somewhat more professional atmosphere in the
federal judiciary.
Many federal judges do not like this idea because it is
rather nice to be an all-purpose philosophical king or queen, and
their positions would become somewhat less glamorous and awesome. I think that what we gain is not so much expertise, which
is what I think Judge Wilkinson was talking about, but the sense
of responsibility that one is somehow a participant in the creation of an intelligent and intelligible body of law. It somewhat
decreases the disadvantage of the common-law system, which is
that litigation is ad hoc and, therefore, no judge sees more than
a little corner of the problem.
It seems to me that our judges perform a vital task. They
are guardians of our liberties. Nevertheless, it also seems to me
that it would be better for all of us if we focused less on the
awesome things that they do. It would be better if the judges
thought of themselves more as lawyers and less as Platonic
guardians or as engineers of social and economic change. It
would be better if they remembered that what they are ultimately paid for is to be a court, and that a court is an institution which must evoke a sense of institutional responsibility if it
is to function well as a court. You must ask yourself, then, what
is a court meant to do? Their opinions should not be deemed an
occasion for display, for erudition, or for philosophical and political debate. They are supposed to add useful and intelligible and
intelligent improvements to the body of the law-a commitment
that I think desperately needs regeneration today.
PROFESSOR WRIGHT I am dying of curiosity, but I
guess I will have to wait until the open discussion to find out
where you rank the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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REMARKS OF PROFESSOR DANIEL J. MEADOR*

Let me comment on the papers of Deans Griswold and Carrington. I share their perception of the judicial scene. It seems to
me they have diagnosed it about right and I share their views.
Allow me to add a little bit of factual information about an
aspect of the scene that has been discussed only briefly by one
or two speakers: the state courts as sources of federal judicial
business. This is an obvious point; yet, I think it is one not fully
appreciated. In talking about federal courts, we often consider
the courts of appeals as the only feeders of the Supreme Court's
business and problems, but the state courts are very substantial
sources of business as well.
The National Center for State Courts did a study a few
years ago concerning the involvement of federal law in state supreme court litigation. That study found a three-fold increase in
the volume of federal law in state supreme court opinions in the
twenty-year period between 1959 and 1979.26 Also, I did a survey
a year or two ago on a sampling basis of state supreme court
opinions in the year 1983. I found that twenty-eight percent of
the opinions involved a square decision of a federal question,
which made those decisions eligible for United States Supreme
Court review. Nobody knows how many state supreme court decisions we have in the United States each year. State judicial
statistics are still incomplete and sketchy, but it is clear they
run well into the thousands if you consider all the fifty states.
The survey I did indicated that more than one-fourth of those
many thousands of decisions concerned federal questions and,
therefore, form part of the pool of potential Supreme Court business. 2 7 I think it is very important to keep that in mind as we

look at the totality of the picture. Including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, we have fifty-two nonfederal jurisdictions over which the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction.
We often overlook the fact that in relation to the United States
Supreme Court, state supreme courts on federal question cases
* James Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.S., 1949, Auburn UniJ.D., 1951, University of Alabama; LL.M., 1954, Harvard University.
Complete data from the National Center Study is presented in Meador, Federal
State Supreme Courts, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 347 (1986).
See id.

versity;
26.
Law in
27.
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are in the position of intermediate appellate courts. If we take
those fifty-two nonfederal courts and add in the thirteen United
States Courts of Appeals, we realize that there are sixty-five intermediate appellate tribunals over which the single United
States Supreme Court with nine Justices must preside.
There is no other court of last resort in the Anglo-American
world, or anywhere else in the world to my knowledge, which has
such an extensive span of supervision over inferior appellate
tribunals. Therefore, I have no difficulty at all subscribing to the
view that there is a lack of national appellate capacity, a lack of
appellate capacity at the top of the system.
One approach to curing this problem is that which has been
discussed here several times. I will not elaborate on the proposal,
but I do endorse the creation of something equivalent to the
proposed intercircuit panel. I think of the panel as an overflow
chamber, providing an alternative chamber to which the Supreme Court can refer cases. I am pessimistic, however, about its
adoption. Although I think the problem consists of a whole set
of interrelated, sophisticated problems that perhaps require not
one solution or one line of approach, but rather several simultaneous approaches that are not either/or, I endorse the intercircuit panel as one approach. I think it would do some good, but I
would not stop there.
Indeed, it may work out that what we get is what we can
accomplish politically. It may not be what is best or ideal, but
what can be achieved politically. If we are blocked along one
line, then we must press along another.
The other line I would like to see pursued is to approach the
problem not at the top by creating this overflow chamber for the
Supreme Court, but at the intermediate level by heading the
problem off before it gets to the Supreme Court. In other words,
we could reduce the hydraulic pressure coming up from the bottom to the Supreme Court. This approach to this problem has
also been discussed here several times already, and that is a
redesigning of the intermediate tier, at least to some extent,
along subject matter lines.
Let me say something about this idea because I think it is
important. The situation described by Dean Griswold as a kind
of disintegration of the system in the normal meaning of a sys-

1987]

COMMENTARIES I

tern28 and by Paul Carrington as a lack of effective command
and effective control 29 seems to undermine one of the fundamental notions of our federal constitutional system. The system is
structured, and has been so structured since the Constitution
was ratified in 1787, to grant to the American people a choice
about government. If the people want a matter to be governed in
a diverse and perhaps regionally different way, the choice is very
simple. We simply leave the matter to the states where it already is. We do nothing at the federal level. On the other hand,
if we want something to be dealt with in a nationally uniform
manner, we get Congress to enact a statute, and the enactment
of the statute in itself says that this is a subject to be dealt with
in the same way throughout the nation. We have a few relatively
rare exceptions to this rule in which Congress will enact a statute, but, nevertheless, leave the content of the law to the states.
A good example is the Federal Tort Claims Act under which a
determination of government liability depends on state law. 0
But this situation is relatively rare. We normally think that
when Congress enacts a statute it is because we want and need
the law administered the same way throughout the nation. In
other words, a transaction in South Carolina that is taxable
under the Internal Revenue Code ought to be taxable in Missouri; what is a federal crime in New York ought to be a federal
crime in California; what amounts to unfair labor practice in
Minnesota ought to be unfair labor practice in Florida. The existing system in the federal judiciary, however, thwarts this fundamental political choice that the American people theoretically
have. Today, when Congress enacts a statute, laying down a nationally uniform rule, the situation within the federal judiciary
frustrates the full implementation of that choice because the
structure is such and the conditions are such that we do not
have a guarantee of a nationwide, even-handed, uniform application of the federal law. This situation, to me, is fundamentally
disturbing, and we ought to take steps to try to remedy it.
It seems to me that we can solve the problem in a way that
preserves all the other values that we cherish in the system,
whatever they are. This can be done through careful, creative,

28. See Griswold, supra pp. 405-06.
29. See Carrington, supra pp. 423-25.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982).
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and imaginative institutional architecture. A promising way to
cure these problems is a redesigning along subject matter lines.
There has been a lot of reluctance here to make predictions
(called indiscretions), but I will be indiscreet enough to make a
few little predictions. I will not be embarrassed if in ten, twenty,
or thirty years, when I am no longer around to know about it,
they turn out to be wrong.
One prediction is that the situation is not going to improve
itself. There are people who act as though it is. It seems irresponsible to act on the hope or assumption that the situation
will somehow get better-that the litigiousness of our society
will diminish, that litigation will somehow slacken. Barring a
truly national calamity, something on the order of a depression
in the depths of the early 1930s or a major war, I do not see any
retrenchment in the volume of litigation. This means that we are
likely to need more and more judges to meet that volume, and
this, in turn, will worsen the problem. I predict that is likely to
happen.
I would also predict, and this may be more of a hope than a
prediction, that the solution will ultimately be seen to lie along
the subject matter lines of appellate organization. That solution
is appropriate because it gets us off of the horns of the dilemma
we face. On one hand, if we keep adding judges at the intermediate appellate level to cope with volume, we move ever further
along the road toward the Tower of Babel, the chaos, and the
nonsystem that has been portrayed here.3 1 On the other hand, if
we do not increase judges at the intermediate level to meet the
volume, then we move ever farther along the road toward the
bureaucracy, ever more staff attorneys, ever more law clerks, and
ever more delegation of authority by judges to parajudicial personnel. Neither of those roads is very attractive. I believe the
way out is the subject matter proposal. This can be done at two
levels.
First, forums can be created with nationwide jurisdiction
over certain categories of cases. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit represents a good model for that with nationwide jurisdiction over patents and certain other categories of
cases; yet, it is not a specialized court. It has a diverse and

31. See Carrington, supra p. 429; Griswold, supra pp. 405-06.
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mixed docket. Its judges operate over a considerable span of legal questions. Another good model, though structured differently, is the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, which has
nationwide jurisdiction over certain energy law appeals. Judge
Wilkinson voiced an often-heard concern, which is understandable, that courts specialized along subject matter lines would be
vulnerable to pressures from special interest groups. However, I
think that danger can be avoided by not having too narrow a
range of jurisdiction, by giving the judges a mixed array of matters, and by not confining any judge to a single, narrow category
of case. We can have subject matter organization without
32
"specialization.

We need not do this for the entire range of federal judicial
business. I do not think we need to go to an extreme and create
a single nationwide appellate forum for every type of case. Some
can be left to regional treatment. For example, I would think
diversity cases, if we retain them (and I do not favor that), could
be left with the regional courts of appeals. Federal Employers'
Liability Act 3 8 cases are another example. There are others that

might safely be left in regional appellate hands, but there are
categories in which there is a special need for nationwide uniformity for which there should be a single national appellate forum. Tax cases are a favorite example. We have here on this
platform Dean Griswold. His first advocacy of this idea appeared
over forty years ago. We included such a proposal in the Justice
Department's original draft legislation that led to the creation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Criticisms from various quarters, however, caused the proposal to be dropped in
the interest of moving forward with the bill. I still believe that
tax cases are a fruitful area for this approach. There are others
that could be worked out through careful study.
Subject matter organization at the intermediate appellate
level would reduce the Supreme Court's concerns in those areas,
as has happened in patent cases now. Because there is a single
32. A specific plan for a federal court of appeals is developed in greater detail in
Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF.471 (1983). For a kindred, yet different (although not mutually exclusive) proposal, see Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Deci-

sions, and a Proposalfor a National Court of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a
Continuing Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rxv. 545.

33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
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forum deciding all the patent appeals from the district courts
nationwide, there are no conflicts; the Supreme Court is not
greatly concerned with patent law anymore. Therefore, to ameliorate the Supreme Court's problems, we should approach the
lack of appellate capacity at the top by attacking it from underneath-by creating selected nationwide intermediate appellate
forums for certain subject matters.
Second, with or without the Federal Circuit kind of nationwide courts, I believe there is much to be gained by organizing
each of the regional courts of appeals on a subject matter basis-creating panels within the courts of appeals to which designated cases will go. The pitfalls of specialization can be avoided
by gradual rotation of judges so that no one judge spends an
entire career on one panel and by giving each panel a diverse
mixture of cases. At the trial level, the lawyers and the district
judges would know the judges to whom an appeal would be going. I believe that this would do a great deal to stabilize the
law-to bring coherence and predictability to the law. I think
the knowability of the appellate judges in our system affects the
predictability of the law. Our judges are not wholly fungible. On
the court of appeal in England, one might make a plausible argument that the judges are interchangeable. That, however, is
not the case in this country, and I do not expect it to be. Therefore, the known identity of judges who will decide the appeal
would itself bring a higher degree of stability and predictability
to the law. We can achieve that by internal subject matter organization on the courts of appeals. I think we ought to move
along that line as well as along the line of creating some additional courts like the Federal Circuit.
Let me make a final comment that is not directed toward
the federal judicial problems themselves, but toward an equally
difficult and troubling problem (maybe even more so), which
concerns the means of bringing about any of these changes. This
problem has been mentioned once or twice before. I simply want
to stress it. We have a situation existing presently such that it is
almost impossible to get Congress to pay attention to these
problems and to act. You heard the history of the nineteenth
century traced here today, from the close of the Civil War to the
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Evarts Act 34 in 1891. For about a quarter of a century, there was
ongoing debate about what to do. It took twenty-five years to
bring about the creation of the courts of appeals. In other words,
even then, in a much more uncrowded and leisurely world than
now, it was enormously difficult to adopt reform. It is infinitely
more difficult today to attract congressional attention to these
problems. If one thinks about the pressing issues in Congress-national defense, taxation, health, welfare, and others
across the spectrum of major, volatile political problems-one
sees that the courts have an extraordinarily low priority.
There is no constituency pressing for reform. When I was in
the Department of Justice, for example, we had a bill dealing
with a jurisdictional matter. It was not going anywhere. I talked
to an aide of a senator one day, a member of the Judiciary Committee. This aide told me that the senator was not going to support the bill because he had received calls from a half-dozen
lawyers in his home state. I asked, "What did they say?" He
said, "I do not know. They told him they were opposed to the
bill. He does not know why they are opposed to it." That is all it
takes-six lawyers or fewer to call in and say, "This is a bad bill.
You ought not to go along with it." That is it. No counterforce
or political constituency on the other side exists to support and
press for reform.
What is the solution to this problem of lack of political
power advocating reform? Let me say upfront that I think there
is no perfect solution. I think one of the solutions lies in having
the power of government itself brought to bear on these
problems. Countries of continental Europe have a Ministry of
Justice for this purpose. In England the Lord Chancellor's Office
serves this role. These departments and these officials straddle
all branches of government, and they have political clout and
influence. They are charged with the caretaking of the judiciary.
When something is wrong, they can get legislation enacted to
take care of it. We have no mechanism like that, and I think we
ought to think hard about trying to create something which approximates that proposal. We have had a suggestion for a congressionally created commission for some years. Judge Clifford
Wallace of the Ninth Circuit conducted a survey and wrote a

34. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
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paper on that proposal.35 Chief Justice Burger has urged the creation of such a body.36 There have been bills in Congress. Nevertheless, it is just as difficult to create some mechanism to deal
with the problems as it is to deal with the problems themselves.
These ideas get nowhere either.
I have long believed that the Department of Justice has a
role to play here. It has been my hope that the sort of work that
we attempted to do at the time I was in the Department in the
Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice would
be carried forward. I must say, however, that I have been somewhat disappointed over the lack of attention to these problems
in the current Department of Justice. I do believe that we can
succeed if we have an aggressive United States Attorney General
interested in the functioning of the courts. I think that it is fair
to say that we would not have the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit today had it not been for the work of the Department of Justice. We would not have had the federal magistrate
amendments 37 in the late 1970s had it not been for Justice Department work, and there are other measures of lesser import
that were enacted as the result of the affirmative leadership of
the Attorney General and the Department. That is important, I
think, but especially so in the absence of any popular political
constituency out there. 8 A commission would probably help.
I will leave this as my last point: The problem of bringing
about changes in court structure and procedure and implementing them, whatever those changes are, is, to me, as difficult as it
is to arrive at the solutions themselves.

35. Wallace, Working Paper-Futureof the Judiciary,94 F.R.D. 225 (1982).

36. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Am. Bar Ass'n Midyear Meeting
(Feb. 6, 1983), reprinted in Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,69 A.BA J.

442, 446 (1983).
37. See Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 604,
631, 633-36, 1915 (1982).

38 . For an elaboration of these points, see Meador, Role of the Justice Department
in Maintainingan Effective Judiciary,462
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